











































New frontiers in biosafety and biosecurity
Citation for published version:
Raybould, A 2021, 'New frontiers in biosafety and biosecurity', Frontiers in Bioengineering and
Biotechnology, vol. 9, 727386, pp. 1-5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fbioe.2021.727386
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3389/fbioe.2021.727386
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Aug. 2021
New Frontiers in Biosafety and
Biosecurity
Alan Raybould*
Global Academy of Agriculture and Food Security and the Innogen Institute, Old Surgeons’ Hall, University of Edinburgh,
Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Keywords: sustainable development, regulation, innovation, biotechnology, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology has great potential to contribute to sustainable development. Over the past
18 months, it has enabled rapid deployment of methods to detect, treat and protect people
against infection by SARS-CoV-2 (Baek et al., 2020; Beigel et al., 2020; Voysey et al., 2021). In
addition, gene editing is promising to revolutionize medicine, public health, agriculture and
manufacturing through, among other things, the treatment of hereditary diseases, the control of
agricultural pests and vectors of dangerous human pathogens, the breeding of crops for healthier
diets and livestock for greater animal welfare, and the production of organisms for industrial
biotechnology that produce raw materials that may replace fossil fuels in the manufacture of
numerous products (Barrangou and Doudna, 2016; Collins, 2018; Ricroch, 2019; Clarke and Kitney,
2020).
Nevertheless, application of biotechnology could cause severe harm if the associated risks are not
well managed. Gain-of-function research may increase our knowledge of pathogen evolution;
however, it may also cause catastrophic effects if laboratory containment fails or if the new
knowledge is used to develop biological weapons (Duprex et al., 2015). Treatment of disease
using gene editing, particularly through heritable modifications, raises numerous questions about the
bearing of inter-generational risks and the possible exacerbation of health inequalities (Vasiliou et al.,
2016). And the use of biotechnology in agriculture remains controversial over 25 years after
genetically modified (GM) crops were first grown commercially. Supporters point to reduced
pesticide use, greater carbon sequestration and increased yield and profitability for farmers who grow
GM crops (Brookes and Barfoot, 2018). By contrast, critics claim that the use of GM crops
perpetuates harmful environmental and social consequences of industrial agriculture (Wilson
et al., 2021).
To realize the potential of biotechnology, society must envisage biosafety and biosecurity as more
than simply containment of organisms that have been bioengineered. Biosafety and biosecurity
should seek to enable continuous improvement in policy- and decision-making to optimize the
balance between opportunity and risk in using biotechnology to find sustainable solutions to societal
problems. I discuss three new frontiers that must be opened to achieve this aim: political leadership in
making and justifying choices about the use of biotechnology for sustainable development;
regulations that encourage innovation; and responsible innovation by businesses and responsible
engagement by civil society.
FRONTIER 1: POLICY LEADERSHIP
“Following the science” is a phrase commonly used by governments during their responses to the
spread of SARS-CoV-2 (Stevens, 2020). It implies that “correct” decisions are reached solely by
rigorous scientific analysis and reliable data. However, good decision-making “depends above all on
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sound ethical reasoning that ascribes value and normative
judgement to empirical facts” (Cristina de Campos-Rudinsky
and Undurraga, 2021). Data on the reliability of tests for a virus
and the efficacy and safety of a vaccine alone cannot determine
whether particular people ought be tested or vaccinated. Such
decisions require ethical and political evaluation of what these
procedures are intended to achieve in circumstances where
choices must be made. Once a trade-off has been
identified–for example, between cancer diagnoses and
treatment for COVID-19 during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic
(Dinmohamed et al., 2020)—data on the performance of tests
and vaccines can contribute to the design of options for achieving
the best outcome. However, the definition of “best outcome”
remains a political and ethical choice, not a scientific discovery.
“Following the science” is convenient for decision-makers who
wish to avoid controversy over the reasoning behind the choices
they have made. Prioritizing COVID-19 treatment over cancer
diagnoses is one example. Another is decision-making about
whether to permit cultivation of GM crops in the EU. Here
decisions are regularly postponed to wait for new studies that
ostensibly aim to reduce scientific uncertainty about the
properties of a crop to a level where the correct decision
becomes clear (Mastroeni et al., 2021). However, repeated
failure to reach decisions seems to be more about the
unwillingness or inability of decision-makers to formulate
clear policy aims for GM crops; hence, they request more data
as a delaying tactic rather than as an aid to decision-making
(Devos et al., 2014; Mastroeni et al., 2021). Attempts to contract
out decision-making to “the science” are bad for public policy as
the values underlying choices are not debated, decisions appear
arbitrary, and scientific advisors may be able to make policy
decisions that are not theirs to make (Pielke, 2007; Raybould and
Macdonald, 2018).
Opening the first new frontier for biosafety and biosecurity
requires political leadership to stop hiding behind scientific
advice and clearly define the trade-offs and justify the
inevitable choices that must be made to maximize the
sustainable development opportunities provided by
biotechnology. There will be trade-offs between objectives; for
example, reducing greenhouse gas emissions may be
incompatible with increasing dietary choices. There will also
be trade-offs in delivery of the objectives. Banning all
biotechnology research may maximize short-term human
safety but endanger it in the long term because medicine,
agriculture and manufacturing are unable to innovate.
Conversely, placing no restrictions on research may hasten the
development of life-saving products but also increase the
probability of existential damage to human civilization (Sears,
2020).
In such circumstances, political leadership must choose the
balance between divergent objectives so that policy is co-
ordinated and businesses know what kinds of product are
required. Scientists should encourage political discussion of the
role of biotechnology in enabling these choices and discourage
attempts to avoid debate about choices through “following the
science.” A corollary is that scientists should refrain from using
scientific advice as “stealth advocacy” for their preferred policy
choices (Pielke, 2007). Scientific advisors should provide options,
including the use of biotechnology where suitable, for
accomplishing agreed policy choices; they should not seek to
close down debate by implying that certain policy choices are
scientifically valid or invalid.
FRONTIER 2: REGULATION AND
INNOVATION
Active political leadership provides top-down setting of general
objectives for biotechnology in sustainable development. By
contrast, delivering these objectives requires bottom-up
innovation in the application of biotechnology. Crucial to this
task is whether the principal aim of biotechnology regulatory
policy is elimination of risk or willingness to take acceptable risk
based on the value of the opportunity. The former is sometimes
described as the precautionary principle and the latter as the
innovation principle (Bogner and Torgersen, 2018).
Figure 1 shows different conceptual approaches to regulation
of technology and how the innovation and precautionary
principles differ. Regulation of medical (“red”) biotechnology
seems to apply the innovation principle. While problems in
implementation remain (Syrett, 2020), regulatory authorities
for medicines recognize that regulations must encourage
innovation as well as control risk (Nagai, 2019). To maintain a
suitable balance between innovation and risk, regulation of
medical biotechnology seeks timely adaptation to general
trends, such as the increasing expectations of patients, rapid
scientific developments, and changes in healthcare systems and
the pharmaceutical industry (Eichler et al., 2015). In addition,
decision-making is flexible, with authorities able to issue
emergency use authorizations for products, such as SARS-
CoV-2 vaccines and treatments, that provide countermeasures
to public health crises (Eastman et al., 2020).
Regulation of applications of biotechnology to agriculture,
public health and environmental protection (“green
biotechnology”) seems to apply the precautionary principle or
even technophobia. Evaluation of green biotechnology products
focuses on detecting the potential to cause harm rather than
deliver benefit. Indeed in EU regulatory evaluations,
consideration of the potential benefits of GM crops is
explicitly excluded (Bartsch, 2014). Decision-making is
inflexible, with data requirements being slow adapt to
advances in knowledge about the process of genetic
modification (Herman et al., 2009) and familiarity with the
types of product being evaluated (Raybould and Poppy, 2012;
Bachman et al., 2021).
A precautionary approach to regulation of green
biotechnology has stifled innovation. The product range is
limited, comprising mainly herbicide-tolerant and insect-
resistant GM commodity crops produced by a few large
multinational companies (Bonny, 2017). Innovation is
encouraged when a different regulatory approach is adopted.
Argentina regulates gene-edited (GE) crops similarly to
conventionally bred crops and the range of products and
product developers is markedly greater than for GM crops
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(Whelan et al., 2020). Exempting GE crops from GM regulations
is a good start in changing the focus of regulations for green
biotechnology from precaution to innovation. Making the
regulation of all green biotechnology more like that of red
biotechnology would be even better and represents a second
new frontier for biosafety and biosecurity.
FRONTIER 3: RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION
AND ENGAGEMENT
A third new frontier for biosafety and biosecurity is enthusing
civil society about the potential for biotechnology, particularly
green biotechnology, to deliver sustainable development. If large
sections of society are hostile to biotechnology, political leaders
may be unwilling to make the case for its role in sustainable
development, and regulatory systems are likely to become even
more focused on precaution than innovation, thereby
undermining progress on the other new frontiers.
Eliminating hunger is a vital sustainable development goal.
However, GM crops as a solution to mass starvation may have
been oversold, conveying a rather threatening and pessimistic
tone; in effect, product developers have been saying allow us to
use biotechnology or millions of people will starve (Raybould,
2019). Such messages of “doom and gloom” tend to create apathy,
not inspiration (Knowlton, 2017). It is unsurprising, therefore,
that people are sceptical or even cynical about the motives of GM
product developers and the opportunities for green
biotechnology to contribute to environmental, social and
economic sustainability, even if they accept that it may make
existing systems more productive in the short term.
Creating optimistic messages that green biotechnology can
reduce hunger while also changing aspects of current production
systems that people dislike is crucial. An interesting example is a
paper by Kwon et al. (2020) who used gene editing to make
tomato plants more compact and earlier yielding. Rather than
presenting the crop as a potential improvement for existing
tomato production, they discussed how it could be used in
hydroponic vertical farms. Industrial (“white”) biotechnology
may similarly contribute to changing the societal perception of
biotechnology by developing products that replace meat from
livestock (Rischer et al., 2020).
Certification and standards are useful for product developers
wanting to go beyond regulatory compliance as a way to back up
claims about sustainability. The recently launched British
Standards Institution Responsible Innovation (RI) Guide
provides a structured process for product developers to
demonstrate that they have taken action to minimize the
potential harmful effects and maximize the potential benefits
of their products (Tait et al., 2021). One can envisage
compliance with sustainability standards becoming a part of
such RI exercises. However, current sustainability schemes,
particularly in agriculture, tend to exclude products of
biotechnology (Williams et al., 2018). The lost opportunities
caused by prejudice against biotechnology in the
“sustainability certification industry” emphasizes that
everyone, not just product developers but also NGOs and
other elements of civil society, has a duty to behave
responsibly in debates about the use of biotechnology
(Raybould, 2019).
CONCLUSION
Achieving sustainable development will be extraordinarily
difficult, hence all the different colours of biotechnology
should be evaluated for potential to contribute to its
realization. Regarding biosafety and biosecurity as being
more than the minimization of risk from potentially
dangerous organisms will be key to this enterprise. Biosafety
and biosecurity should be reimagined as techniques for
optimizing the balance between opportunity and risk in the
application of biotechnology to sustainable development.
Achieving this objective requires co-ordinated change on
several fronts: political leadership to make and justify policy
choices that maximize opportunities for biotechnology to find
FIGURE 1 | A conceptual classification of approaches to regulation developed from Chataway et al. (2006) and Raybould (2019).
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sustainable solutions to societal problems; regulations that
consider the need to innovate as being at least as important
as the need to be precautionary; and civil society that is prepared
to engage responsibly in policy debates about the potential
contribution of biotechnology to sustainable development.
The final element may be the most difficult to achieve as
there is considerable vested interest in defining sustainability
as being fundamentally incompatible with the use of
biotechnology.
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